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The Doxastic Practice Approach

We have thus far considered two different versions of the parity
thesis. Neither of them is successful, or so I have argued. There is a
third possibility, however, one that emerges from some claims in
Alston's "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology." My
goals in this chapter are to explain Alston's doxastic practice ap
proach, to explain the parity thesis that emerges from that ap
proach, and to show how the background belief challenge applies
to it. This is the last of the parity theses I mine out of Alston's
work.
I.

A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology

In the essay in question, Alston suggests a second approach to
the issue of being justified in a belief that a practice is reliable. He
distinguishes between metaepistemology and substantive episte
mology. The former is "a view about epistemology, its nature,
conduct, methodology, and prospects-rather than a position de
veloped in the prosecution of the discipline itself."' The latter is the
doing of epistemology proper-the discovery of epistemic prac
tices, exploring how they are structured, what the criteria of justiI. Alston, "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology," in Knowledge
and Skepticism, ed. M. Clay and K. Lehrer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989),
p. 24.
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fication or rationality are, and so forth. The distinction is impor
tant for my argument, for one cannot decide about the viability of
the parity thesis without understanding the connections between
epistemic justification and reliability, and one cannot understand
these connections without understanding at what level one's ques
tions about them arise.
So, in "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach," a metaepistemological
essay, Alston gives an account of the rationality of engaging in an
epistemic practice with an eye on the issue of whether an epistemic
practice is reliable. This contrasts with the epistemological essay,
"Epistemic Circularity," in which Alston defends, using the more
direct approach considered in Chapter 4, the thesis that one can be
justified in believing that a practice is reliable. How do these ap
proaches fit together? The burden of this section is to outline Al
ston's argument in "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" with a view
to explaining how that argument impinges on the conclusions of
"Epistemic Circularity. " In particular, I aim at spelling out the
connections Alston thinks there are among rationality, justifica
tion, and reliability, for we cannot get clear about the final version
of Alston's parity thesis unless we are clear about these connec
tions.
The central question of"A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" is how
one is to determine which, if any, epistemic principles are adequate
or, in other words, what it takes to be justified in accepting a prin
ciple of justification. That, of course, depends on what justification
is. Alston works here with the truth-conducive account discussed
in Chapter 4· Given this account, to show that a principle is accept
able one must show that it specifies a reliable mode of belief forma
tion. But to do this is to rely, at some point, on a circular argu
ment, since every mode of belief formation belongs to a basic
practice. As we have seen in "Epistemic Circularity," Alston ar
gues that not all circular arguments are logically so and in particu
lar argues that one kind of circular argument can lend support to
beliefs about reliability. In short, "epistemic circularity does nQt
prevent one from showing, on the basis of empirical premises that
are ultimately based on sense perception [where sense perception is
his example of an epistemic practice], that sense perception is reli
able. " The problem with this, as he puts it, is that "whether one
actually does succeed in this depends on one's being justified in
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those perceptual premises, and that in turn, according to our as
sumptions about justification, depends on sense perception being a
reliable source of belief. In other words, if (and only if) sense per
ception is reliable, we can show it to be reliable. But how can we
cancel out that if?"2
The problem, otherwise stated, is that, given this approach to
justifying reliability beliefs, any belief-forming mechanism or prac
tice can be validated, on certain assumptions:
If all else fails, we can

simply

use each belief twice over, once as

testee and once as tester. Consider crystal ball gazing. Gazing into
the crystal ball, the seer makes a series of pronouncements: p, q, r,

s....

Is this a reliable mode of belief-formation?

shown as follows.

The

Yes.

That can

be

gazer forms the belief that p, and, using the

same procedure, ascertains that p.By running through a series of be
liefs in this way, we discover that the accuracy of this mode of be

is 100%! . . . Thus, if we allow the use of mode of
M to determine whether the beliefs formed by M
are true, M is sure to get a clean bill of health. But a line of argu
ment that will validate any mode of belief-formation, no matter
how irresponsible, is not what we are looking for. We want, and

lief-formation

belief-formation

need, something much more discriminating.3

This "retesting" approach for showing a practice reliable appears
to be what Alston advocates in "Epistemic Circularity," although
there he fills in the details of how the argument might go. If I am
correct about this, then Alston is between a rock and a hard place.
On the rocky side, he has to show why my suggestions about the
unavailability of the retesting for CP do not vitiate the skeptical
claim that all practices have "trivial self-support" (as Alston later
calls it) and therefore why we should not use the retesting ap
proach to evaluate a practice's reliability. On my account, PP turns
out to be epistemically superior to CP. In other words, even given
the antecedent assumption of reliability needed for the soundness
of the argument (to the conclusion that a practice is reliable and
hence justifiably engaged in), there are some practices for which
trivial self-support is not forthcoming. CP is one such practice.
But Alston rejects the possibility of using the retesting approach to
2. Ibid., p. 3·
J. Ibid.
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the end of showing a belief in reliability justified. He instead claims
that all practices appear to have this trivial self-support, and thus
that we need some other way of adjudicating between practices in
terms of their reliability.
Which brings us to the hard place: PTAs appears to be trivially
true. If all practices can be shown to be reliable via this trivial self
support, then not only is PTAs true, but a parity thesis stating that
all practices have J.; is true. This is obviously not the case, as Al
ston clearly assumes in the essay under consideration. Neverthe
less, let Alston's point stand, and let us see how he makes out his
case in answering the question he sets before us: how are we to
adjudicate among epistemic practices in terms of their reliability? I
return to this rocky terrain in the next section.
What is the doxastic practice approach? Alston relies on the
work of Wittgenstein (stripped of its verificationist assumptions)
and Reid to help him out. Several aspects of their thought are help
ful. First, "we engage in a plurality of doxastic practices, each with
its own sources of belief, its own conditions of justification, its
own fundamental beliefs, and, in some cases, its own subject mat
ter, its own conceptual framework, and its own repertoire of pos
sible "overriders. "' These practices, although distinct, are not
wholly independent and are engaged in together rather than sep
arately. Furthermore there are "generational" and "transforma
tional" practices, the former producing beliefs from nondoxastic
inputs, the latter transforming belief inputs into other beliefs. Each
of the generational practices has its own distinctive subject matter
and conceptual scheme. Second, "these practices are acquired and
engaged in well before one is explicitly aware of them and critically
reflects on them." Practice thus precedes theory: first we must
learn to engage in a practice, and only then can we reflect on its
nature. Third, practices of belief formation develop in the context
of wider spheres of practice. For example, "we learn to form per
ceptual beliefs along with, and as a part of, learning to deal with
perceived objects in the pursuit of our ends. " Finally, "these prac
tices are thoroughly social: socially established by socially mon
itored learning, and socially shared. "4
So far, says Alston, this is just cognitive social psychology.
4· Ibid., pp. s-s.
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What has this to do with epistemology? Here he shifts to an indi
rect approach. Rather than asking how psychology helps us deter
mine which epistemic practices are reliable-in other words, a
question about epistemic justification-he asks what resources the
approach gives us for determining whether a given practice is ratio
nally accepted or engaged in.
There are, says Alston, two positions one might take on the
connection between psychology and epistemology. The first, "au
tonomism,""holds that epistemology is autonomous vis-a-vis psy
chology and other sciences dealing with cognition. It holds that
epistemology is essentially a normative or evaluative enterprise,
and that here as elsewhere values are not determined by fact." The
difficulty with this position is just that there appear to be no nonar
bitrary standards by which to carry out an evaluation of epistemic
practices. To evaluate epistemic practices one must engage in
them. According to "heteronomism," in contrast, "if the epis
temologist is to escape such arbitrariness, he must content himself
with delineating the contours of established doxastic practices, per
haps neating them up a bit and rendering them more internally
coherent and more consonant with each other. He must give up
pretensions to an Archimedean point from which he can carry out
an impartial evaluation of all practices. "5 There is, then, an antin
omy between autonomism and heteronomism.
Alston's solution to the antinomy is twofold. First, he notes that
neither side does full justice to epistemology. Autonomism has the
difficulties already noted and is forced to recognize that the attrac
tiveness of certain principles lies simply in the fact that we learned
to engage in practices in which those principles are embedded and
we did so before reflecting on the practices. On the other side, the
heteronomist fails to recognize that to relegate epistemology to a
corner where its only task is to tidy up its principles is to overlook
the nature of epistemology as a philosophical enterprise, an enter
prise that asks general questions. Second, he distinguishes between
"a more or less tightly structured practice with more or less fixed
rules, criteria, and standards, on the one hand, and a relatively free,
unstructured "improvisational" activity on the other." The former
1s more or less narrowly confined by antecedent rules and pros. Ibid., pp. IO-II.
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cedures that constitute the practice (although not everything is in
variable). The latter calls for an exercise of "judgment" that relies
on "no established rules or criteria [that] put tight constraints on
what judgment is to be made in a particular situation." Philosophy
falls on the second side of the contrast and so the resolution to the
antinomy is as follows:
The epistemologist, in seeking to carry out a rational evaluation of
one or another doxastic practice, is not working within a particular
such practice. Nor need she be proposing to establish a novel prac
tice, the specifications of which she has drawn up herself in her
study. On the other hand, she need not abjure everything, or any
thing, she has learned from the various practices she has mastered.
She makes use of her doxastic skills and tendencies, not by follow
ing the relatively fixed rules and procedures of some particular prac
tice, but by using all this in a freer fashion. 6
Thus, the doxastic practice approach to epistemology recognizes
the importance of what we learn at our mother's knee but also
the value of critical reflection on what we learn. This leaves un
answered the question with which Alston set out: how can we go
about justifying epistemic practices as reliable? We cannot establish
reliability for one practice without establishing it for all. But if we
shift the question to, what is the rational attitude toward epistemic
practices? some progress can be made. Rejecting the view that radi
cal skepticism with regard to epistemic practices is viable, Alston
notes that we can take all socially established practices to be prima
facie rational; that is, we can take all socially established practices as
"rationally engaged in, pending sufficient reasons to take any of
them as unreliable, and pending any other sufficient disqualifying
considerations, if any. "7 Why limit the scope to the socially estab
lished rather than opening it to all practices? Simply put, eccentric
practices such as Cedric's consultation of sun-dried tomatoes as an
indicator of stock market activity do not have a track record. Only
when a doxastic practice has persisted over many generations does
it earn the right to be considered seriously. There is a presumption
in favor of socially established practices which idiosyncratic prac
tices do not have.
6. Ibid., pp. 12-14.
7· Ibid., p. 16.
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If we are to evaluate practices then, we have to do it in terms of
a negative approach. Which practices disqualify themselves? That
depends on the kinds of considerations taken into account as po
tential disqualifiers. Alston suggests three. First, a practice can be
disqualified by "persistent and irremediable inconsistency in its
output." This counts as a disqualifier because massive inconsis
tency is a sure indicator of significant falsehood in one's set of be
liefs. Second, a massive and persistent inconsistency between the
outputs of two practices indicates that at least one of them is
faulty. Alston suggests that we follow a conservative route at this
point, taking the more firmly established practice over the less. His
reason? It seems to him to be"the only principle that . . . [is] both
unchauvinistic and eminently plausible. "8
Alston's final suggestion"has to do not with a ground for defini
tive rejection, but with something that will strengthen or weaken
the prima facie acceptability. The point is this. A practice's claim to
acceptance is strengthened by significant 'self-support,' and the
claim is weakened by the absence of such." How can Alston turn
to self-support, since he has rejected epistemically circular consid
erations? There are, he says, different sorts of self-support. The
sort of self-support in which the same belief is used both as tester
and testee is too easy and provides only trivial results. Not all
kinds of self-support are so trivial:
Consider the following ways in which SPP [sense perceptual doxas
tic practice] supports its own claims. (r) By engaging in SPP and
allied memory and inferential practices we are enabled to make pre
dictions, many of which turn out to be correct, and thereby we
are able to anticipate and control, to some considerable extent, the
course of events. (2) By relying on SPP and associated practices we
are able to establish facts about the operations of sense perception
that show both that it is a reliable source of belief and why it is
reliable. These results are by no means trivial. It can not be taken for
granted that any practice whatever will yield comparable fruits. It is
quite conceivable that we should not have attained this kind or de
gree of success at prediction and control by relying on the output of
SPP; and it is equally conceivable that this output should not have
put us in a position to acquire sufficient understanding of the work
ings of perception to see why it can be relied on. To be sure, an
8. Ibid. , p. 17.
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argument from these fruits to the reliability of SPP is still infected
with epistemic circularity; apart from reliance on SPP we have no
way of knowing the outcome of our attempts at prediction and con
trol, and no way of confirming our suppositions about the workings
of perception. Nevertheless, this is not the trivial epistemically cir
cular support that necessarily extends to every practice. Many prac
tices can not show anything analogous; crystal ball gazing and the
reading of entrails cannot. Since SPP supports itself in ways it con
ceivably might not, and in ways other practices do not, its prima
facie claims to acceptance are thereby strengthened; and if crystal ball
gazing lacks any non-trivial support, its claims suffer by compari
son.•
This does not mean that we should expect all practices to be self
supported in the SPP way, for example, by predictive capabilities.
Such requirements are neither necessary nor important for other
practices. But we can and should look at other practices to consider
their fruits and whether they are appropriate to the aims of those
practices. The basic point is, however, that practices may or may
not have self-support of this epistemically circular but nontrivial
sort and thereby be strengthened or weakened from the point of
view of their overall rationality.
Alston closes the essay by considering the relationship between
rationality as he construes it and the original issues of reliability
and justification. As it turns out, the prima facie rationality of en
gaging in a practice entails neither the reliability of the practice nor
a justification for a belief in its reliability. This is true, in part at
least, because the notion of justification cum reliability is an "ob
jectivist " notion whereas the notion of rationality is an "subjec
tivist " one, the former applying to beliefs, the latter applying to
practices. Why the distinction?
The short story is this. I have tried to be objectivist as long as possi
ble. But the difficulties in establishing justification (rationality) for
beliefs in an objectivist sense drives us (sooner or later, and why
make it any later?) to appeal to an internalist rationality for prac
tices. If one still wonders why we couldn't have used an internalist
conception of justification for beliefs in the first place . . .
. . . the answer is quite simple. So long as we consider beliefs in
9. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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isolation, we have no sufficient basis for an internalist judgment of
rationality. . . . We come onto something really helpful only when
we take the mode of belief-formation concretely, as an aspect of a
practice that is socially established and that plays a central role in
human life. Then, and only then, do we find reasons for a judgment
that it is reasonable to engage in the practice.
What then is the connection between the rationality of a practice
and its reliability?"To accept some doxastic practice . . . as rational
is to judge that it is rational to take it as a way of finding out what
(some aspect of) the world is like; it is to judge that to form beliefs
in accordance with this practice is to reflect the character of some
stretch of reality. " This move does not imply an entailment of re
liability by rationality. But logical entailment is not the only kind.
There is pragmatic implication, for example, such as that found in
belief; in believing p one is taking p to be true. But the belief in p
does not entail p's truth, and neither does rationality entail re
liability. Nevertheless, judging a practice to be rational seems to
imply that one soundly judges it to be reliable and also that one
soundly judges it to be justifiably engaged in. 10
2.

Alstonian Justification Old and New Once More

How are Alston's various versions of justification and rationality
related? We have seen some relations. My interest, however, is in
connecting the conclusions of"A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach " to
the two versions of the parity thesis I have suggested. One way
to approach this task is to ask how Alston's notion of rationality
is related to the notions of Jns and Jnw as originally construed in
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief. " Alston's original intu
itions were to suggest that Jnw is the best we can do from the epi
stemic point of view, since Je is out of reach. This leaves us with
only a prima facie notion of justification. As we have seen, later he
argues that ]eg is possibly attainable and that in fact it is the most
desirable from the epistemic point of view. Later yet, he suggests
that, although we may have the better kind of epistemic justifica
tion, full reflective justification is not possible. This leaves us with
a notion of rationality spelled out in terms of what is prima facie.
IO. Ibid. , pp. 2 1-2].
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Perhaps Alston's shift to the doxastic practice approach is con
nected to his original intuition-that Je is not within our reach, or
at least not fully so. Because Alston shifts ground when moving
from justification to rationality, we end up not with ]eg plain and
simple but ]eg understood through the doxastic practice approach
that in turn leaves us with prima facie judgments as to the J� of a
practice and thus the ]eg of its deliverances.
In the previous chapter I noted that much of our interest in PTA
derives from the supposition that both PP and CP are only Jnw·
Since it looks as if PP is capable of being more strongly supported
(from the epistemic point of view) than CP-for example, to the
level of J� rather than just Jn-PTA is not so interesting. We want
something more than prima facie justification if we can get it, so
PT AS comes out as worthy of consideration. But now that we
know that J� must be, so to speak, filtered through a doxastic
practice approach, should we not recast Alston's parity thesis in
terms of prima facie rationality? Since, according to Alston, all
epistemic or doxastic practices can be shown to be reliable (using
the trivial methodology he suggests and the assumption it makes),
the interesting claim that a practice is reliable is disabled; no sorting
among practices seems epistemically promising. The move to the
question of rationality resurrects the possibility of sorting among
practices. Although a judgment that it is rational to engage in a
practice includes a sound judgment that the practice is reliable, the
former entails neither that the practice is reliable nor our needing to
show that the practice is reliable.
Given this suggestion, a new parity thesis emerges:
Parity Thesis'tston (PT:x): Under appropriate conditions,
both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are prima
facie rational.
Understood in this way, Alston's parity thesis avoids the problems
presented above but once again needs evaluation. Is it true?
The first thing to note is that PTX does not fall prey to the
charge that CP lacks indicators of reliability whereas PP does not,
where this is taken to show that one is rational whereas the other is
not. This charge is not successful against PTX for the reasons Al
ston develops in defending CP's Jnw in "Christian Experience and
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Christian Belief." Unlike PTAs• where positive reasons are needed
to show reliability, prima facie rationality and Jnw are explained in
terms of negative conditions, namely, that a practice is prima facie
rationally engaged in (or Jnw) unless there are reasons not to take it
as rational (or justified). So a lack of confirmation or, for that mat
ter, a lack of any indicator of reliability does not remove the prima
facie rationality needed for PTl
But what Alston says does allow for various levels of strength of
rationality beyond the prima facie when he points to various kinds
of self-support for an epistemic practice. Significant self-support
adds to the overall rationality of engaging in a practice. The trivial
testee-tester type of self-support cannot help us distinguish among
various strengths of rationality, for such support is, says Alston,
available for all doxastic practices. But other kinds of self-support
are not. For example, the predictability engendered by SPP, its
usefulness in anticipating and controlling the course of events, and
the fact that we can use SPP to understand how it operates provide
self-support of a kind that not every practice has. Crystal ball gaz
ing and the reading of entrails have neither these features nor any
thing analogous. Since SPP supports itself in ways it might not
have, and in ways that other practices do not, its claims to ratio
nality are stronger than they might otherwise have been.
But there is an important warning to consider here:·
We must be careful not to take up another chauvinistic stance, that
of supposing that a practice can be non-trivially self-supported only
in the SPP way. The acceptability of rational intuition or deductive
reasoning is not weakened by the fact that reliance on the outputs of
these practices does not lead to achievements in prediction and con
trol. The point is that they are, by their very nature, unsuitable for
this use; they are not "designed" to give us information that could
serve as the basis for such results. Since they do not purport to
provide information about the physical environment, it would be
unreasonable in the extreme to condemn them for not providing us
with an evidential basis for predictive hypotheses. Similarly, I have
argued in . . . ["Christian Experience and Christian Belief'] that it is
equally inappropriate to expect predictive efficacy from the practice
of forming beliefs about God on the basis of religious experience,
and equally misguided to consider the claims of that practice to be
weakened by its failure to contribute to achievements of this ilk. On
the other hand, we can consider whether these other practices yield
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fruits that are appropriate to their character and aims. And it would
seem that the combination of rational intuition and deduction yields
impressive and fairly stable abstract systems, while the religious ex
periential practice mentioned earlier provides effective guidance to
spiritual development."
The lack of predictive efficacy of a practice does not show that
the practice is unreliable. And we must not expect all practices to
have the kind of nontrivial self-support that separates the non
trivially supported from the trivially supported in terms of ratio
nality. Nor must we expect all kinds of nontrivial self-support to
be alike. There are then at least two classes of doxastic practices:
those that are trivially supported (all practices fall into this class)
and those that have additional, nontrivial support (a subclass of the
larger).
Can the differences among the nontrivial kinds of self-support
allow us to divide the subclass into further subclasses in terms of
strength of overall rationality? Perhaps, but Alston suggests no
way to do this. In fact, one might make the following argument
against such an adjudication. Since it is not the case that the result
of SPP (its help in our getting around in the physical world) is
epistemically superior to results of other practices (the building of
stable abstract systems or spiritual development), how could one
adjudicate between them? These goals and results are not epistemic
but practical, and on that point the goals and results of each prac
tice may simply be different. When the practices work well they
are self-supported in a way that distances them from those that do
not work well-those that are merely trivially self-supported-and
thus strengthened in their claim to rationality. But once moved
into the inner circle of nontrivially self-supported practices, further
adjudication on epistemic grounds seems unlikely. For the goals
and results are internal, as is the judgment that those goals are met
by the results. It is the internal nature of the judgment that appar
ently disallows epistemic comparison of the winning practices.
Thus it seems unlikely that one can successfully make out an argu
ment that PP is more strongly nontrivially self-supported than CP
on epistemic grounds. A challenge to PT� based on that approach
does not seem to have a high likelihood of success.
I I.

Ibid.' p. 19.
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But this argument needs to contend with two issues. First is the
issue of evaluating CP and PP in terms of the closeness of the cog
nitive connection between the experiences and the beliefs generated
by the practices. Recall that CP and PP seem to differ on whether
they are conceptual-reading practices or noninferential mediated
practices. I argued that PP is the former, CP the latter, and that
Alston needs to refine further the notion of Jnw· Taking prima facie
rationality and its connections to epistemic justification and re
liability as further refinements of the general idea behind Jnw• or at
least of Alston's initial intuition that Jnw is the best we can do epi
stemically, perhaps it can be suggested that there are levels of
strength within the winning circle of epistemic practices. Would
such adjudication among levels be an epistemic adjudication? I be
lieve so, but I postpone the detailed argument for this point until
Chapter 8.
Second, if, as Alston says, the features of predictability, univer
sal engagement, and like conceptual schemes are "desiderata for an
epistemic practice " from a cognitive point of view, then PP is su
perior in that way to CP and to all other practices that fail to have
those features, by his own admission.12 Of course, that things "go
more smoothly, more satisfyingly, " from the cognitive point of
view when certain features are present does not in itself show that a
practice with those features is reliable. On this point Alston seems
quite correct. But it does show, on Alston's terms, that a practice
failing to have those features, or analogous features, does not have
as strong a rational claim. This is indicated by Alston's unwilling
ness to accept those doxastic practices that are idiosyncratic or not
socially accepted, such as Cedric's sun-dried tomato approach to
the stock market or the use of entrails for teaching us about politi
cal events. These idiosyncratic practices lack the significant self
support of the predictable SPP, for example.
But can we rank practices within the subclass of the nontrivially
self-supported by kinds of self-support? We can, given Alston's
admission that, "if we were shaping the world to our heart's de
sire, I dare say that we would arrange for our practices to exhibit
these features [e. g. , predictive power, universal engagement, and
12. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. 123-24, for
details.
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so forth]," after which he goes on to argue that CP and PP are
both Jnw even though the former lacks the features whose presence would
increase its cognitive attractiveness. 13 But this ranking is done from the
cognitive point of view, and one wonders what cognition has to
do with epistemic justification. Being cognitively more satisfying
does not provide evidence of reliability and hence does not provide
evidence of justification either. Perhaps the best we can say is that
the cognitive attractiveness influences only one's rational engage
ment in a practice. And, as Alston argues, rationality and justifica
tion are not the same thing. But that cognitive attractiveness influ
ences the rational acceptance of a practice does at least indicate our
preference for certain kinds of practice over others (e. g. , predictive
practices over nonpredictive), and accordingly we can rank prac
tices in terms of their desirability from a rational-cognitive point of
view. The more desirable a practice is from the cognitive point of
view, the more rational it is to engage in that practice. This point
links to the first issue, for surely it is more desirable from the cog
nitive point of view to have our beliefs closely read off our experi
ences; the distinction between conceptual-reading and noninfer
ential mediated practices becomes important at precisely this
juncture. Insofar as a practice puts our beliefs more directly in
touch with the experiences that generate them than not (that is,
insofar as a practice is a conceptual-reading practice rather than a
noninferential mediated practice), it is more rational to engage in
that practice.
Is there a direct connection between the nontrivial self-support
to which Alston points (predictive power or spiritual formative
power) and conceptual-reading versus noninferential mediated
practices? If being conceptually read is more cognitively satisfying
than being noninferentially mediated, then one might suggest that
only practices that are the former are also predictive or universally
engaged in. But this is not the case, since there are epistemic prac
tices that seem to be neither conceptually read nor predictive,
for example, pure mathematics. Pure mathematics, it would seem,
should rank fairly high in terms of our rational engagement
therein. Nevertheless, just as we would construct the world, if we
could, in such a way that our experiential epistemic practices had
IJ. Ibid., p. 124.
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the features of predictability, universal engagement, and so forth,
so we would construct the world such that our experientially based
practices were of the conceptual-reading sort. Such a world is more
desirable from the cognitive point of view. That we have such a
wish allows for a ranking of strengths of rationality on the simple
ground that one practice more immediately connects the beliefs it
generates to the experiences on which it rests than others.
Thus the ranking of practices from within the subclass of ratio
nal practices is quite complex. It involves ranking certain features
dealing with the internal goals of a practice to its deliverances (e. g. ,
does the practice aim to be predictive and is it? vs. does the practice
aim to develop its participants's spiritual formation and does it?).
But it also involves sortings on the basis of whether a practice
is experientially based (pure mathematics vs. PP or CP) as well as
rankings among experientially based practices in terms of how
closely connected the beliefs it delivers are to the experiences that
generate those beliefs. This last ranking seems to involve a signifi
cant epistemic aspect, for the noninferential mediated generation of
beliefs involves other background beliefs that stand in need of epi
stemic justification, an issue to which I return in Chapters 7 and 8.
What does all this have to do with PT�? I am suggesting that
one can rank practices within the subclass of the nontrivially self
supported from a cognitive point of view and that, although some
practices rank higher than others, this does not show that the lower
are not prima facie rational. But then even though PT� may be
true, it stands in need of further refinement, just as PTA does. Al
though it is interesting that CP and PP are both prima facie ratio
nal, if there are further levels of strength of rationality to which we
have access, then we ought to consider those. Although PP and CP
may have the same kind of rationality-PP with its predictive self
support and CP with its spiritual development self-support-the
former has a stronger level of self support; PP is a conceptual
reading practice and CP is only a noninferential mediated practice.
As such, the former ranks more highly in terms of its overall ratio
nality. Thus although PT� is, left without refinement, true, a
closer analysis indicates that PP and CP do not have the same level
of rational strength beyond the prima facie level, and a more cir
cumspect statement of the parity thesis needs to indicate that dif
ference in level.

The Doxastic Practice Approach

[

The original thought behind the parity thesis was that PP and
CP have the same kind and level of epistemic justification. Alston's
epistemology seems to indicate that ultimate judgments of re
liability, and hence justification, can only be done (in any helpful
way) from the point of view of rationality.14 Does PT'X fulfill the
original aims of Alston's project in comparing religious and non
religious beliefs and practices? Insofar as one's judgment that one's
engaging in a practice is rational is a judgment that one's engaging
in it is justified and that the practice is reliable, then yes it does.
And perhaps that is the best we can do-a sort of meta
epistemological thesis that CP and PP are on a par. But even un
derstood in metaepistemological terms, PT'X stands in need of fur
ther refinement because of the various strengths of the claims to
rationality beyond the merely prima facie level.
In this and the previous several chapters I have argued that Al
ston's initial parity thesis stands in need of further clarification and
that a stronger version based on his later work is not true. In
Chapter 2 I raised difficulties based on distinctions between nonin
ferential mediated belief formation and conceptual-reading belief
formation. Applying those distinctions, I have suggested that, al
though noninferential mediated beliefs (or practices) and concep
tual-reading beliefs (or practices) might be Jnw• the former are not
as strongly justified as the latter. The distinction on which that
argument rests was uncovered by considering the problems of
identifying individuals. Such identifications require, following the
background belief challenge, a special role for background beliefs
(beyond mere concepts) in the generation of beliefs about spatio
temporally nonrooted individuals. The failure of the stronger ver
sion of the parity thesis (PTAs) rests on a lack of inductive evidence
for the claim that CP is reliable. This lack of evidence is traceable
in part to a lack of regularity and predictability of the object the
beliefs are about and hence a lack of confirmation for the deliv
erances of CP. But a further account of the parity thesis (PT'X) is
developed in which the emphasis is shifted from epistemic justifica
tion to prima facie rationality. Here too there are various rankings
14. Internal judgments of reliability can be made within the practice on the basis
of evidence.
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beyond the prima facie one can give to practices and thus, although
PT'X is more refined than PTA• it still needs to include a reference
to the various ways a practice may be ranked. Once that is done,
CP and PP, although both minimally prima facie rational, can also
be shown to have different levels of strength beyond the prima
facie. But we are primarily interested in the account of the stron
gest kind and level of rationality (cum justification) we can have,
and we therefore want the parity thesis to reflect that strength.
Since CP and PP can apparently be ranked beyond the prima facie
level, and they turn out, if my argument is correct, to have differ
ent levels of strength beyond the prima facie, PT'X is the strongest
parity thesis we can have. Stronger versions turn out to be false. In
short, PT'X, like PTA• does not reflect what more can be said. It is
misleading in a certain way-leaving us, perhaps, with the false
confidence that since both PP and CP have prima facie rationality
they are equal in epistemic strength. They are not.

